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RANK AMONG EQUALS
Ben A. McJunkin*
Dignity, Rank, and Rights. By Jeremy Waldron. New York: Oxford University Press. 2012. Pp. 10, 147. $29.95.
Introduction
Dignity is on the march. Once regarded as a subject exclusively within
the province of antiquated moral philosophy, dignity—that “shibboleth of
all perplexed and empty-headed moralists”1—has recently developed into a
cornerstone of contemporary legal discourse.2 Internationally, the concept of
human dignity has been central to the emergence and acceptance of universal human rights.3 Dignity, in some form, is guaranteed by such seminal
documents as the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,4 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,5 the German Basic Law,6 and the South
African Constitution.7 Domestically, appeals to dignity undergird popular
legal arguments for social and political rights at both the state and federal
levels.8 Human dignity has been cited with surprising frequency in the recent
opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court—including nine times (and “indignity”
once more) in Justice Kennedy’s recent majority opinion in United States v.
Windsor, which struck down a central provision of the Defense of Marriage

* Associate, Covington & Burling LLP. I would like to thank Catharine MacKinnon,
Christopher McCrudden, J.J. Prescott, and Marc Spindelman for helpful feedback and
encouragement on this piece. I would also like to thank the editors of the Michigan Law
Review for their thoughtful work.
1. Arthur Schopenhauer, The Basis of Morality 101 (Arthur Brodrick Bullock
trans., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 2d ed. 1915) (1840).
2. Christopher McCrudden, In Pursuit Of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current
Debates, in Understanding Human Dignity 1, 1 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) (“The
concept of human dignity has probably never been so omnipresent in everyday speech, or so
deeply embedded in political and legal discourse.”).
3. Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning 1–2 (2012).
4. U.N. Charter pmbl.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl., art. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
6. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I art. 1, § 1 (Ger.).
7. S. Afr. Const., 1996, §§ 1, 7, 10.
8. See, e.g., Katherine Franke, Dignifying Rights: A Comment on Jeremy Waldron’s Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 Ariz. St. L.J. 1177, 1184–85, 1194–99 (2011) (providing
examples of human dignity’s being used in arguments supporting same-sex marriage rights).
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Act (“DOMA”).9 Scholarly engagement with dignity’s legal dimensions has
never been more prevalent or more important.
Against this backdrop of emergent (and still emerging) interest in the
jurisprudence of dignity, Jeremy Waldron10 offers Dignity, Rank, and Rights,
a profound and provocative take on the relationship between dignity and the
law. Looking to the concept’s use in legal contexts, Waldron contends that
human dignity operates as an elevated legal status that entails individual
human rights. He casts what he sees as the law’s normative commitment to
universalize human dignity as the gradual democratization of aristocratic
privilege, a process Waldron describes as “a sort of leveling up” of humanity
(p. 64). Although Waldron presents these two accounts of dignity as part of
a single, self-reinforcing argument,11 astute readers will note their independence. The first account identifies what contemporary legal dignity consists
of and how it operates. The second offers up something like an origin story
for that contemporary conception, one that attempts to reconcile dignity’s
history as a strongly hierarchical notion with the egalitarian undercurrents
of the modern-day human-rights movement. By interweaving these accounts, Waldron believes he can offer a conception of legal dignity that
salvages its universality while avoiding the pitfalls of grounding such a critical tool in the murky realm of moral thought.
Dignity, Rank, and Rights is a refreshing work of legal philosophy. Edited and introduced by Meir Dan-Cohen,12 the book comprises two lectures
by Professor Waldron; commentaries on those lectures by Michael Rosen,13
Don Herzog,14 and Wai Chee Dimock;15 and a reply by Waldron to his commentators. Aided by the commentaries, Dignity, Rank, and Rights unfolds
more like a rich conversation than an arid academic defense. Yet Waldron’s
book is perhaps most useful to those already well versed in the debates over
the meaning of human dignity and its relationship to the law. Articulating
his account of human dignity as an elevated legal status, Waldron draws
upon a diverse array of thinkers and texts—from John Locke and John Austin to Hannah Arendt and Lewis Carroll (pp. 20, 58 n.34, 23 & 39 n.31, 29).
He also dispenses with competing visions of human dignity quickly, and
with no shortage of nuance (pp. 22–30). The resultant book is both pointed
9. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689, 2692–94, 2696 (2013). For a detailed
survey of the Supreme Court’s invocations of human dignity, see Leslie Meltzer Henry, The
Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 169, 178–81 (2011) (chronicling the frequency and
variety of references to dignity in Supreme Court decisions).
10. University Professor, New York University School of Law.
11. For example, Waldron suggests that we can see contemporary dignity as a universal
legal status only if we first “understand the dynamics of the movement between modern notions of human dignity and an older notion of rank.” P. 33.
12. Milo Reese Robbins Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of
Law.
13. Professor of Government, Harvard University.
14. Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
15. William Lampson Professor of English & American Studies, Yale University.
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and poignant, if not the ideal primer for the novice starting to engage with
dignity’s jurisprudential dimensions.
This Review disentangles Waldron’s twin accounts in the hope of laying
bare the implications of his work. Part I sets out the methodological and
substantive dimensions of Waldron’s project to cast contemporary dignity in
terms of legal status. It contrasts Waldron’s status claim with more traditional visions of dignity as a legal value, examining both the relationship of
dignity to human rights and the normative strength of dignity’s universal
distribution. Although Waldron sees his depiction of human dignity as
breaking with important traditions, his work is largely synthetic—it offers a
singular conception of dignity that encapsulates many features of established
accounts by reimagining them as the privileges and immunities attending
status. This Part also briefly examines the Windsor decision as a touchstone
for domestic understandings of dignity’s operation in legal contexts.
Part II explores and critiques Waldron’s account of human dignity as a
gradual extension of aristocratic rank. Borrowing from feminist theory and
queer theory, as well as from the equality projects to which they are allied,
this Part notes some troubles with extending preexisting rights in the guise
of equality. Specifically, it examines the ways in which the narratives Waldron deploys may entrench social norms that perpetuate inequality and injustice while limiting the potential for marginalized groups to employ
dignity as a deeply remedial legal tool. This Part concludes by suggesting
that Waldron may be able to strengthen the normative grip of dignity as a
rights-entailing status by incorporating those notions of human worth that
have been central to dignity-based antidiscrimination and antisubordination
projects.
I. Dignity as Rank
Despite widespread commitment to the concept of human dignity, there
remains a deep disagreement in both legal and philosophical circles about
dignity’s nature and content.16 At its most basic, the notion of “human dignity” typically connotes something like a fundamental respect for each person’s humanity.17 But the two prevailing conceptions of human dignity,
those drawn from the writings of Immanuel Kant and from Judeo–Christian
teachings, exemplify how sharply such a simple idea can diverge in application. Kantian dignity—most frequently summarized by the maxim that persons should be treated as ends in themselves, never as mere means—is
16. See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 655, 675 (2008) (“It is clear that the idea of dignity has become a
central organizing principle in the idea of universal human rights, although with interesting
differences between jurisdictions, and that there are several different strands of metaphysical
and philosophical thinking feeding these differences.”).
17. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 198 (1977) (“This idea, associated
with Kant, but defended by philosophers of different schools, supposes that there are ways of
treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the human
community, and holds that such treatment is profoundly unjust.”).
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grounded in respect for the uniquely human capacity for autonomous moral
reasoning.18 By contrast, Judeo–Christian human dignity is a corollary to the
concept of imago dei, the belief that all persons are made in God’s image and
thus carry some “inner, transcendental kernel” of the sacred that commands
respect.19 Applying these competing conceptions of dignity to a singular legal issue—abortion, for example—produces arguments cutting in opposing
directions.20
In Dignity, Rank, and Rights, Waldron tries to sidestep just such metaphysical or theological precommitments, which tend to be a source of deep
disagreement.21 Rather than assume, as many do, that legal invocations of
human dignity import their content from particular moral accounts, Waldron postulates that human dignity can be analyzed first and foremost as a
legal concept, much in the same way that we think of, say, consideration in
contract law as principally a legal, rather than moral, idea.22 As Waldron
notes, dignity already operates as a legal tool; the language of dignity already
“enriches our vocabulary,” and “many of those riches arise in the first instance from law.”23 Accordingly, he wants to explore “how the concept
works in its legal habitat and see whether the jurisprudence of dignity can
cast any light on its use in moral discourse” (p. 14). Thus Waldron’s project
is not one of derivation from first principles but of interpretation of existing
practices.
By beginning in law, Waldron’s methodology allows him to engage directly with the work that dignity is busy performing in legal discourse, particularly human-rights discourse. It also permits him to avoid the “often
destructive or, at best, reductive” skepticism, most frequently seen in modern moral philosophy, about whether we need a concept of dignity at all (p.
134). Yet Waldron sets himself an onerous task. To elevate dignity to the
18. Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 65, 76 (2011). See
generally Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 96–101 (Jens
Timmermann ed., Mary Gregor & Jens Timmermann trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) (2d
ed. 1786).
19. See Rosen, supra note 3, at 3, 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection, 117 Yale L.J. 1694, 1738–39,
1750–51 (2008) (explaining that Kantian conceptions of dignity emphasize the woman’s autonomous choice while religious conceptions emphasize the dignity of the potential child).
21. For example, Kant’s account of dignity crucially depends on the existence of a noumenal self, an increasingly rejected idea even among his modern disciples. Meir Dan-Cohen,
Harmful Thoughts: Essays on Law, Self, and Morality 2 (2002).
22. At times, Waldron overreaches to defend this methodology. For example, he asserts
at one point that “‘dignity’ is not a term that crops up much in ordinary moral conversation.”
P. 14. Both Rosen and Dimock appropriately chastise Waldron for this claim. It may very well
be that moral philosophers have abandoned the term (and Waldron’s statement becomes less
surprising when he reveals it to be the product of a lunchtime conversation with Joseph Raz).
But, as Rosen explains, dignity is certainly alive and well in ordinary discourse and, when
invoked, unquestionably makes a moral claim. P. 83.
23. P. 137. More so than Waldron, I am sympathetic to Dimock’s suggestion that the
concept of dignity is rightly at home in a multitude of alternative habitats, “being differently
shaped by each of these different environments.” P. 120.
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realm of substantive legal principle rather than “mere slogan,”24 Waldron
seeks to articulate an account of contemporary human dignity that will
unify its disparate legal uses and aid in the further development of a cohesive human-rights jurisprudence. In the following Sections, I first examine
Waldron’s attempt to find such unity by deploying the concept of legal status. I then consider the ramifications of that move, both for dignity’s normative grounding and for Waldron’s particular methodology.
A. The Nature of Dignity
What Waldron finds when he examines dignity’s operation in law—particularly in human-rights law—is an apparent contradiction. On the one
hand, law frequently contains straightforward protections of individual dignity. For example, the Geneva Conventions expressly denounce “outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”25
Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees certain
rights in order to ensure “an existence worthy of human dignity.”26 Formulations like these are consistent with an increasing trend in legal discourse to
describe fundamental concepts as abstract values, in the sense typically implied by value theory.27 In fact, some sources explicitly identify dignity as a
value to be promoted or secured through the operation of law.28 Values of
this sort are attained through the protection offered by specific rights; rights
are a means to the value as an end. Criminal laws against rape, for example,
are widely justified by their protection of the value of individual autonomy.29
Likewise, sexual-harassment law is often understood as promoting the value
of gender equality.30 Many accounts of human dignity proceed this way,
24. Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 Brit. Med. J. 1419, 1420 (2003)
(“[T]o invoke the concept of dignity without clarifying its meaning is to use a mere slogan.”).
25. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art.
3(c), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
26. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 23(3).
27. See Mark Schroeder, Value Theory, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (May 29, 2012), http:/
/plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/value-theory/.
28. The South African Constitution, for example, explicitly “affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom.” S. Afr. Const., 1996, § 7(1) (emphasis added);
see also Oscar Schacter, Editorial Comment, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 Am. J.
Int’l L. 848, 848 (1983) (“The ‘dignity of the human person’ and ‘human dignity’ are phrases
that have come to be used as an expression of a basic value accepted in a broad sense by all
peoples.”).
29. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on Akayesu,
44 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 940, 941 (2006) (“[C]onceptually speaking, emphasis on nonconsent as definitive of rape views the crime fundamentally as a deprivation of sexual freedom, a
denial of individual self-acting.”).
30. Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: The Challenges of Creating Sexual Harassment Protections for Prisons and Other Nonworkplace Settings, 83 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2009)
(“It is generally understood that sexual harassment is wrong because it denies its victims the
right to workplace gender equality.”).
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focusing on the instrumental use of human rights to secure a given conception of dignity.31
On the other hand, dignity is frequently cited in human-rights law as
the foundational principle that grounds other rights. For example, both the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights state that all human
rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.”32 Dignity, in
this sense, is presupposed to explain the entitlement of individuals to the
enumerated rights. Because dignity as a foundational principle must be logically antecedent to the rights it grounds, it is inconsistent with the instrumental relationship imagined by rights to dignity.33 While accounts that
posit some objective, intrinsic human dignity are well suited to perform this
foundational role,34 they are largely incompatible with Waldron’s hypothesis
of a purely legal dignity, one that does not depend upon the adoption of a
particular moral worldview.
This ostensible circularity—“[d]ignity is what some of our rights are
rights to; but dignity is also what grounds all of our rights” (p. 17)—motivates Waldron to reconsider dignity’s character. Eschewing the language of
value, Waldron instead contends that legal dignity “is a normative status and
that many human rights may be understood as incidents of that status” (p.
18). The relationship between status and rights, Waldron tells us, is not like
the ends–means relationship of a value but rather “more like the relation
between a set and its members” (p. 18). That is, a status both comprises
certain rights and simultaneously “conveys the point of clustering those particular rights and duties together in a certain way” (p. 139). Elsewhere, Waldron has expanded on this idea, explaining that a status’s “primary
structural presence in the law is justificatory: it works to package certain
31. See, e.g., James Griffin, On Human Rights 29–32 (2008) (arguing that claims to
human dignity reference a value of personhood, which is secured by the provision of particular human rights, such as the right to food); L. Camille Hébert, Divorcing Sexual Harassment
from Sex: Lessons from the French, 21 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 1, 31–43 (2013) (advocating
for the adoption of sexual-harassment provisions designed to secure the value of dignity in the
workplace).
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pmbl., adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty. Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights pmbl., adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
33. See Luı́s Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 331, 357 (2012)
(“It would be contradictory to make human dignity a right in its own, however, because it is
regarded as the foundation for all truly fundamental rights and the source of at least part of
their core content.”).
34. For example, the Kantian incommensurability of persons might serve as a foundation
for laws against prostitution. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective,
96 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 10–11 (2011). Similarly, imago dei might entail legal restrictions on abortion and birth control. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and Sexuality: Claims on Dignity in Transnational Debates over Abortion and Same-Sex Marriage, 10 Int’l J. Const. L. 355, 371–73 (2012).
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arrays of rights, duties, etc. under the auspices of a certain entrenched concern in the law.”35 By invoking the concept of status, Waldron believes he
can solve the circularity of dignity: individual entitlements to the status of
dignity animate legal protections that characterize dignity as the content of
rights; meanwhile, the status itself generates entitlements to the rights that
constitute it, allowing dignity to be, in Waldron’s terms, “foundation-ish”
(p. 21), if not quite foundational.
Waldron contends that a status-based account of dignity also better conforms to our intuitions about dignity than does a value-based alternative.
For instance, status better accommodates the view that dignity simultaneously confers rights and imposes concomitant moral obligations on its
bearer (pp. 140–41). Waldron has examined his idea elsewhere in the context of what he describes as “responsibility-rights.”36 There, he articulated
his view that dignity includes (or perhaps is defined by) a sphere of responsibility within which one has a certain authority to which the law must defer.37 As a source of responsibility, legal dignity is more than a mere passive
value to Waldron; it includes an affirmative “obligation to maintain the elevated status to which one is called as a human being” (pp. 140–41). Indeed,
Waldron’s dignity is almost ontological—it is “a rank or status that a person
may occupy in society, display in his bearing and self-presentation, and exhibit in his speech and actions” (p. 28).
Etymologically, the word “dignity” has long been linked with elevated
status, in the form of social standing.38 But this is principally the dignity that
attends a noble birth, an honorific office, or even an especially worthy institution.39 Few scholars have seriously considered that the particular dignity
we enlist to ground human rights might be fundamentally understood as an
assertion of ranking status (with all the pomp and mien and, most importantly, hierarchy that such claims typically entail).40
Indeed, Waldron’s claim is all the more intriguing because legal statuses,
despite a very lengthy history, are increasingly disused. Statuses reflect a sort
of top-down categorization of individuals and the assignment of legal

35. Jeremy Waldron, Does “Equal Moral Status” Add Anything to Right Reason? 8 (N.Y.
Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-52,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1898689.
36. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 Ariz. St. L.J. 1107, 1120–21
(2011).
37. Id. at 1121.
38. E.g., Rosen, supra note 3, at 11 (“‘Dignity’ originated as a concept that denoted high
social status and the honors and respectful treatment that are due to someone who occupied
that position.”).
39. See McCrudden, supra note 16, at 657.
40. Waldron explicitly states that ideas of social differentiation and hierarchy are necessary to his claim, since it is a vision of extending to everyone the dignity associated with the
highest level of a preexisting hierarchy. Pp. 133–34.
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significance to those categories.41 Famously, if somewhat overstated, the
whole of modern law has been described as a rejection of such classifications
and the embrace of individual self-definition.42 The statuses that remain in
legal use are largely functional classifications created in service of policy.
Consider the legal ramifications of marital status. Currently, over 1,000 federal statutes (not to mention countless state laws and administrative regulations) premise an individual’s rights and responsibilities on whether he or
she is married.43 Even with such far-reaching implications, marital status is
merely conditional (at least for those who have been granted access to the
institution): it reflects only one’s current circumstances, which may be temporary and which are typically the result of affirmative choices by the status
holder.
Waldron envisions legal dignity as a more fundamental, more enduring
kind of status. Dignity is what Waldron refers to as a “sortal” status—a
status that represents a person’s permanent social standing based on the
“sort” of person one is (p. 59). Examples of sortal statuses in contemporary
legal regimes are hard to find, likely because our relatively recent history
demonstrates their dangers. In the United States, for example, those who
held the legal status of “woman” could not vote in federal elections until
1920.44 Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, being both married and a
woman in America denied a person the legal capacities to own property,
enter into contracts, or earn a salary of her own.45 In other countries, sortal
statuses have been used to justify some of the most horrific crimes against
humanity. Perhaps some part of what makes Waldron’s account of dignityas-rank so provocative is his attempt to revive and reform statuses of this
sort by recasting them as the fundamental basis for the provision of human
rights.
Waldron’s thesis is not merely provocative; it is also prescient. Legal dignity is increasingly invoked to connote statuslike features of the type Waldron describes. Just last term, the U.S. Supreme Court premised its
pathbreaking marriage decision, United States v. Windsor, on the status implications of the denial of human dignity. Windsor invalidated Section 3 of
DOMA, which defined “marriage,” for all federal purposes, as “only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.”46 The lawsuit was brought on behalf of a widow who had been lawfully married to a
41. See R.H. Graveson, The Movement from Status to Contract, 4 Mod. L. Rev. 261, 261
(1941) (explaining that statuses fix “the rights and duties, capacities and incapacities of the
individual . . . as a consequence of his belonging to a class”).
42. See Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law 163–66 (Ashley Montagu ed., Univ. of
Ariz. Press 1986) (1861).
43. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
44. See generally U.S. Const. amend. XIX.
45. Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism,
and the Family, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 981–83, 983 n.101 (2002).
46. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
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same-sex partner under New York law but who was denied the marital exemption under the federal estate tax.47
The Windsor Court explained that the “State’s decision to give this class
of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of
immense import.”48 That decision “is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment
of the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by
the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.”49 New York’s grant of dignity permitted same-sex couples “to define
themselves by their commitment to each other” and to “live with pride in
themselves and their union and in a status of equality with all other married
persons.”50 According to the Court, DOMA’s “essence” was its “interference
with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the
States in the exercise of their sovereign power.”51 As Justice Kennedy explained, “The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all
who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”52 Because “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity,” the Windsor
Court declared the statutory provision unconstitutional.53
As Windsor illustrates, invocations of dignity, at least domestically, include statuslike features of doctrinal significance. Windsor’s dignity is conferred by the state, expresses meaning about the standing of the dignified,
and, as Waldron predicted, imposes obligations even as it affords rights.54
These features appear to be unaccounted for by those who regard dignity as
a mere value. There is consequently considerable promise in a theory like
Waldron’s, which taps into these underexamined aspects of dignity’s nature
in constructing an account of the concept.
B.

The Case for Normativity

All that said, Waldron has a problem. If the invocation of dignity in law
means nothing more than describing a legally conferred status, the human
rights secured by dignity’s foundation are nothing more than social constructs. By building his theory around dignity’s legal functions, Waldron has
divorced his account of dignity’s nature from the metaphysical or theological
rationales that tend to require dignity’s universal recognition and inalienable
47. Id. at 2682.
48. Id. at 2692.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2689.
51. Id. at 2693.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 2696.
54. See id. at 2694 (“Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity
of the person.”).
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character. Situating human dignity in the legal realm, Waldron risks reducing the mystical to the mundane.
Even within the legal sphere, values offer a stronger claim to normativity
than do statuses. Merely identifying something as a legal value entails a
claim that the designated end is good and worth pursuing. Statuses make no
such normative claim. As Dan-Cohen succinctly explains in his introduction, this weakness in Waldron’s account of dignity marks the difference
between our “celebrating and cheering” the universal provision of dignitybased human rights and our “providing an argument in favor of this development that would give it some normative grounding” (p. 6).
Waldron suggests that we may overcome this weakness in his account by
observing that law is committed to dignity in its most fundamental modus
operandi. In this endeavor, Waldron draws heavily upon the work of Lon
Fuller, who nearly five decades ago articulated a connection between human
dignity and law’s “inner morality.”55 According to Waldron, “the characteristic modes of law’s application and legal compliance are deeply dignitarian
in their character” (p. 135). Governance by the rule of law, he explains,
involves legal subjects’ active participation—a fact that demonstrates the
law’s profound respect for the dignity of the human person (p. 54). Such
respect is arguably deeper and (importantly) more lasting than that conveyed by, say, legal prohibitions flatly outlawing undignified treatment.
To begin, Waldron notes that legal norms necessarily guide human conduct through a process of self-application (p. 52). Those who are subject to
legal rules are expected to recognize and follow them. In this way, applying
legal rules to human beings is fundamentally different from, say, prodding
cattle or herding sheep. Waldron views this difference as considerable evidence that the rule of law endows ordinary people with the dignity of the
highest judges. “They are their own officials: they recognize a norm, they
apprehend its bearing on their conduct, and they make a determination and
act on it” (p. 53). As Fuller has previously described this idea, law calls on its
subjects to employ self-control or self-correction, and thus it necessarily defers to human beings as responsible agents who are capable of subordinating
self-interest to a universal norm.56
Supplementing this idea, Waldron notes that legal rules are frequently
framed as indeterminate standards (such as “reasonableness”) (p. 53). Such
standards require more than mere adherence to the law; they demand that
legal subjects exercise reasoned judgment about what the law requires in
particular situations. In this way, legal subjects participate in crafting the
very requirements by which they are bound. Waldron cites this mode of
participation as evidence of law’s fundamental respect for human dignity (p.
54).
55. See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 42–46 (rev. ed. 1969). Waldron has
explicitly defended Fuller’s account of internal morality elsewhere. See Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1135, 1157–60
(2008).
56. Fuller, supra note 55, at 162–67.
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Principles of due process likewise underscore law’s participatory nature,
according to Waldron. Those subject to legal processes have the right to
make arguments to their judges and to present evidence on their own behalf.
Where disability or incapacity hinders the opportunity to participate fully,
legal subjects are entitled to representatives to speak for them. For Waldron,
such principles are evidence that the law is committed to considering the
unique perspective of everyone—that it treats the lowliest individuals with
the dignity of the very highest.57 Even the right to vote, Waldron suggests,
can be understood in this momentous way, “as the entitlement of each person, as part of his or her dignity as an (equal) peer of the realm, to be
consulted in public affairs” (p. 36).
Waldron also suggests that dignity is to be found in the inherent nature
of rights claims. Drawing on the work of H.L.A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, and
Ronald Dworkin, Waldron describes how modern legal systems characteristically operate by enforcing individual entitlements—that any claims made
under a system of law will necessarily be made in the language of rights.58 As
Waldron glibly notes, “A party in law does not phrase his argument in terms
of its being a rather good idea to require a defendant or respondent to pay
such and such a sum of money . . .” (p. 51). Indeed, the ability to seek
redress through law is itself traditionally couched in terms of a person’s
“right” to be heard.
The vehicle of rights establishes a certain sort of standing or considerability to which the law must defer.59 Rights create a personal entitlement in
every legal subject to “push his case before us and demand that it be considered” (p. 50). According to Waldron, we expect human dignity “to be associated with a furious sense of one’s rights and a willingness to stand up for
them as part of what it means to stand up for what is best and most important in oneself” (p. 145). In providing individuals with rights—the power to
insist on particular treatment and hence define the duties of others—the law

57. Pp. 61–62. As a point of contrast, Waldron invites us to imagine a lowly caste in a
hierarchical society:
There would be no question of trusting them or anything they said; they would appear in
shackles if they appeared in a hearing at all; like slaves in ancient Athens, their evidence
would be required to be taken under torture; and they would not be entitled to make
decisions or arguments relating to their own defense, nor to have their statements heard
or taken seriously.

P. 57
58. See generally Dworkin, supra note 17, at 81–90; Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value
of Rights, 4 J. Value Inquiry 243 (1970); H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 Phil.
Rev. 175 (1955).
59. See Franke, supra note 8, at 1181 (“This may even be understood as a rule of standing: Those who are irresponsible, undignified, (or dare I say beastly?), have no standing to
make rights claims.”).
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thus implicitly acknowledges the dignity of its citizens (pp. 50–51). The picture of dignity that emerges in Waldron’s account is effectively a paradigm
of active citizenship in a liberal legal regime.60
I should note that the above argument for human dignity’s foundational
place in the rule of law provides one of the only glimpses in Dignity, Rank,
and Rights of Waldron’s substantive vision of human dignity. Overwhelmingly, Waldron’s focus in the book involves articulating and defending the
claim that legal dignity is best understood as a ranking status. He expends
comparatively little effort exploring the content of that status—which rights
it entails and what “entrenched concern” those rights reflect. Yet dignity’s
content is particularly important when it comes to understanding the difference between the respect owed to others’ dignity qua status and the respect
(if any) owed to others’ dignity qua dignity. Rosen puts this point well:
If we take the view that dignitary harms are essentially symbolic—failures
to express respect for status—then we must believe either that all violations
of fundamental human rights are essentially symbolic or that dignity cannot fulfill the role assigned to it in our basic human rights documents—to
provide a foundation for the rights embodied in them. (p. 95)

But if human dignity requires respect in a more substantive sense (for example, in the way we respect the law by not violating it), “we need to know the
content of dignity; without it we could not respect dignity any more than we
could observe the law without knowing what it was” (pp. 94–95).
What we see in Waldron’s work is an attempt to paint human dignity as
something akin to the institutional privileges and immunities that attend
territorial sovereignty.61 The rights of self-governance, lawmaking, and
standing that Waldron cites all have clear historical analogues, frequently
grounded in the language of dignity, in the context of state and national
sovereignty.62 I am skeptical, however, that Waldron succeeds in drawing a
connection between law’s “inner morality,” whatever that may be, and dignity as a legal status. Waldron’s particular examples are seductive precisely
because they also track the established accounts of dignity in moral philosophy that Waldron’s project was supposed to sidestep.

60. At one point, Waldron himself proclaims, “If I were to give a name the status I have
in mind, the high rank or dignity attributed to every member of the community and associated with their fundamental rights, I might choose the term ‘legal citizenship.’” P. 60.
61. As I demonstrate infra in Part II, Waldron intends this portrayal rather literally, suggesting that our contemporary conception of dignity is a product of gradually extending to
everyone the rights held by aristocrats.
62. See, e.g., 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *98 (“[I]t is beneath the dignity of
the king’s courts to be merely ancillary to other inferior jurisdictions . . . .”); An Act Declaring
the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the Crown (Bill of
Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., c.2 (Eng.) (granting special legal respect to the “Crown and royal
dignity”); Henry, supra note 9, at 192–99 (surveying the role of dignity in Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding state sovereign immunity).
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Consider legal self-application, which many of the book’s commentators
regard as the most striking feature of Waldron’s account of dignity.63 Certainly, one can easily draw the comparison between it and a monarch’s right
to self-rule. But it may just as easily be portrayed as an instantiation of Kantian rational autonomy.64 Waldron describes this aspect of dignity under the
rule of law as “a matter of people fine-tuning their behavior effectively and
gracefully in response to the legitimate demands that may be made upon
them, controlling external behavior—monitoring it and modulating it in
accordance with one’s understanding of a norm” (p. 53).65 With striking
similarity, Kant claimed that dignity exists in the human capacity to
subordinate bestial impulses and to follow self-crafted rules of reason. Indeed, in my favorite formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant, no less
so than Waldron, treats us all with the dignity of hypothetical lawgivers.66
This is not to say that Waldron is wrong for finding dignity in these
contexts. Many thinkers have linked human dignity with the capacity for
agency and moral reasoning67 or with the entitlement to equal concern and
respect before the law.68 But Waldron falls short of showing that such examples reflect the law’s inherent deference to human dignity as a kind of rightsentailing legal status.
Relatedly—and more troublingly, in my opinion—this glimpse into dignity’s content raises questions about Waldron’s commitment to his own announced methodology. Waldron promises his readers an account of dignity
that starts from how the concept “works in its legal habitat” (p. 14)—an
account, as I understood it, constructed on a foundation of current social
practices. The law is replete with overt invocations of dignity that could
serve as just such a foundation. Yet, to my knowledge, dignity plays little role
63. Herzog, for instance, claims to be “wholly in agreement” with the idea that “the law
credits us with self-command, and that that is an ascription of dignity.” P. 115. Similarly,
Dimock reports being “especially struck” by Waldron’s view of dignity “as an internal mechanism of self-application and self-monitoring, a style of enforcement that distinguishes the rule
of law from being a purely coercive instrumentality.” P. 120.
64. “Autonomy” in the Kantian sense is closely related to its Greek roots (“auto” meaning “self” and “nomos” meaning “law”). Kant believed that dignity inheres in the human
capacity for moral reasoning—to recognize universal moral commandments and to obey
them. See Kant, supra note 18, at 42–46.
65. Query why Waldron views such self-restraint as a manifestation of human dignity
rather than Foucauldian discipline. See generally Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish
202–03 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. 1995) (“He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and
who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously
plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.”).
66. Kant, supra note 18, at 41–42.
67. Indeed, a frequent criticism of dignity is that its elaborations often reduce to a kind
of autonomy. See, e.g., Macklin, supra note 24, at 1419 (explaining that “dignity seems to be
nothing other than respect for autonomy”); Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, New Republic, May 28, 2008, at 28 (“When the concept of dignity is precisely specified, . . . ultimately
it’s just another application of the principle of autonomy.”).
68. See Dworkin, supra note 17, at 179–81.
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in the immanent justifications for those specific practices that Waldron cites
as evidencing the most fundamental relationship between dignity and law. It
is therefore disappointing to see Waldron retreat to such examples in an
effort to secure dignity’s normative grip.
If Waldron is correct that contemporary legal dignity is a status, the
content of dignity should emerge from those rights that currently attend the
status. Domestically, at least, dignity animates the right to participate in the
judgment of others rather than the right to be a judge unto oneself.69 It is
protected, not by the right to give testimony, but by the right to be free from
testifying.70 And rather than the power to define the duties of others, dignity
is the freedom from definition by others—it is “to define one’s own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.”71 An account of legal dignity that is faithful to Waldron’s stated methodology should work backwards from rights such as these to divine the “entrenched concern” that motivates dignity, as a legal status, in the first
instance. While Waldron’s focus in Dignity, Rank, and Rights may lie elsewhere (specifically, on articulating the shape and scope of a status-based
conception of dignity), a proper examination of dignity’s content should
trace the justificatory bases of legal dignity wherever they may lead.
II. Rank Among Equals
The second thread I wish to explore in Dignity, Rank, and Rights is Waldron’s account of dignity’s historical development. Unlike the account just
covered, which purports to explain contemporary legal dignity’s nature and
operation, this second account attempts to describe the origins and evolution of our contemporary notions.72 Dignity is a concept that was once intimately associated with the high rank of aristocracy. The ancient Roman
cognate for dignity (dignitas) referred to the honor, status, and privilege of
office, particularly the offices held by aristocrats. The English language ultimately incorporated this connotation of the word, frequently employing it
to describe the station of nobility. Contemporary uses of “dignity,” Waldron
avers, must either descend from this aristocratic sense of the word or else
reference a substitute conception that somehow displaced the aristocratic
one.
69. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130 (1994) (holding that gender is an
unconstitutional basis for juror selection); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding
that “racial discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the dignity of
persons and the integrity of the courts”).
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
71. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. To be clear, Waldron himself does not distinguish between these two accounts and
indeed often uses them in mutually reinforcing ways. I separate them here for the purpose of
highlighting my concerns with Waldron’s diachronic account, which I believe to be severable
from his claim that legal dignity operates as a high-ranking status.
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Given his claim that contemporary notions of dignity operate as a form
of status, it is no surprise that Waldron favors continuity. His historical account of dignity is perhaps best understood, then, as an attempt to reconcile
the preenlightenment conceptions of dignity as a ranking status with the
normative commitment to fundamental equality that undergirds much of
human-rights law. To that end, Waldron suggests that the aristocratic connotations of dignity were not lost or replaced but in fact have been extended
universally—that the ordinary citizen has now “leveled up” into the onceexclusive privileges of aristocracy (pp. 31–33).
This is a troubling suggestion. Conceiving of universal human dignity as
the mere extension of preexisting privileges not only limits dignity’s potential use as a legal tool (by restricting its forms to those extant) but may also
be affirmatively harmful to a human-rights project that aims to destabilize
existing structures of inequality. Below, I both describe and argue against
embracing the purportedly historical aspects of Waldron’s work.
A. Extending Privilege
Waldron believes that our contemporary invocations of human dignity
manifest “an upwards equalization of rank, so that we now try to accord to
every human being something of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was formerly accorded to nobility.”73 In his commentary, Rosen
describes this as Waldron’s “‘expanding circle’ view” of dignity: Waldron
posits that the high rank of dignity, once reserved for “a relatively narrow
class” of person, “has come to be extended over time until it is, to all intents
and purposes, universal” (p. 79). To construct this account, Waldron first
surveys “the traditional meaning of dignity associated with high or noble
rank” and the legal protections that such rank entailed (p. 34). He then
explores the ways in which those protections are now shared by the ordinary
person—a “transvaluation of values,” Waldron claims (p. 32)—including
through the provision of universal human rights (pp. 34–36).
As an example of this phenomenon, Waldron recounts the tale of the
Countess of Rutland, who in 1606 was forcibly arrested and held captive as a
result of an alleged debt (p. 56). Under English law at the time, such arrests
were permitted as to commoners. But the countess’s arrest was held to be
illegal as inconsistent with the dignity of her station. Waldron notes how the
law now accords all persons that same dignity—“no one’s body is allowed to
be seized; no one can be held or imprisoned for debt”—and he views this as
a monumental achievement (p. 57). Forcibly requiring debtors to discharge
their debts treats humans with the status of animals—incapable of behaving
rightly without coercion. The abolishment of debtor’s prisons evidences the
law’s commitment now to treat all humans as dignified—capable of selfcontrol, legal self-application, and a kind of responsible agency.

73. P. 33. Waldron attributes this idea to Gregory Vlastos. P. 34. See generally Gregory
Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in Theories of Rights 41, 41–76 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
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Such examples are also why Waldron characterizes dignity’s development as involving leveling up. We currently organize ourselves not like a
society without nobility or rank—we did not, after all, strip the countess of
her legal immunity—but rather “like an aristocratic society that has just one
rank (and a pretty high rank at that) for all of us.”74 As Dimock describes it,
“What Waldron is proposing, then, would seem not only to be a common
denominator, but a very high one” (p. 119).
At the outset, we should be skeptical when a legal theory begins from
historical privilege, extends that privilege to all, and then declares equality.75
The problem with this move is that the egalitarian distribution of preexisting
rights does not ensure equal access to, use of, or benefit from those rights.76
And yet the rhetoric of equality in the distribution of rights often masks
these very failings. The issue—it is important to emphasize—is the incongruence of extending “equally” to new groups rights that have been tailormade for others, particularly rights that historically have been predicated on,
or are constitutive of, inequality in fact.
As a point of contrast to the Countess of Rutland, consider another
example that Waldron uses to demonstrate humanity’s “leveling up,” this
one captured in the proverbial saying “An Englishman’s home is his castle”
(p. 34). For Waldron, such a saying evidences the very transvaluation of
dignity that lies at the heart of his account. As he sees it, the law’s deference
to the privacy of the home treats every commoner with the dignity of
royalty:
The idea is that we are to live secure in our homes, with all the normative
force that a noble’s habituation of his ancestral fortress might entail. The
modesty of our dwellings does not signify that the right of privacy or security against incursion, search, or seizure is any less momentous. (p. 34)

Of course, those concerned with gender equality have long understood
this “dignitarian” privilege against state intrusion to insulate and perpetuate
considerable abuse and indignity.77 Likewise, it is well understood that
74. P. 34. Some commentators question the coherence of a “rank” that does no meaningful sorting among persons. E.g., Franke, supra note 8, at 1179. Waldron’s rejoinder is that
we have retained the loftiness of rank without the corresponding subordination: “High status
can be universalized and still remain high . . . .” P. 60.
75. See Stephanie M. Wildman with Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making
Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 881, 890 (1995). We might begin by
noting that the ancient Roman dignitas, upon which so much of Waldron’s theory is premised,
was itself closely tied to cultural performances of masculinity and femininity. See Cicero, On
Duties bk. 1, para. 130 (M.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (44
B.C.E.) (“There are two types of beauty; one includes gracefulness, and the other dignity. We
ought to think gracefulness a feminine quality and dignity a masculine one.”).
76. And this is to say nothing of the potential for rights generally to insulate private
subordination, legitimate injustices, and alienate individuals from their communities. See, e.g.,
Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
713, 719–21 (2011).
77. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2150–61 (1996).
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inherent inequalities in the home substantially impair women’s abilities to
assert their legal rights—to “stand up for themselves” and “control the pursuit and prosecution of their own grievances,” as Waldron’s idealized dignity
bearer is wont to do.78 Thus an Englishman’s dignity becomes an Englishwoman’s lack, twice over.
In his commentary, Herzog sharply criticizes Waldron’s account of dignity as expanding specifically aristocratic entitlements. Herzog’s understandable concern is that aristocratic rights have historically operated as an
immunity from the legal processes that might hold them answerable for
their failings (p. 101). The “dignity” associated with aristocracy elevated that
class of persons above the law. Herzog objects to casting contemporary legal
dignity in that same mold:
[I]t’s not enough to say we’ve leveled up. Human dignity has to be more
than offering everyone the kind of legal dignity once enjoyed by aristocrats.
It has to reconstruct or reject that dignity because we have no interest in
casting dignity as the haughty business of behaving badly and refusing to
be held accountable for it. (p. 106)

Whatever the merits of this criticism—and it seems to me that Waldron
equivocates on the necessity of any particular form of right constituting dignity—Herzog’s challenge is fundamentally about the nature of aristocratic
dignity. My concern is more straightforward: the narrative of “expansion,”
regardless of the specific rights being expanded, valorizes and normativizes
the positions of privilege within existing social hierarchies. It allows “entrenched power—the perspective from the top of the inequality hierarchy—
[to] control[ ] the real and how it is seen and authoritatively contended
with.”79
Recall, again, the dignitarian dimension of the discourse emerging from
the legal recognition of same-sex relationships. In Lawrence v. Texas, the
Supreme Court affirmed that gay men and lesbian women are in fact human
beings entitled to “dignity as free persons” and thus to liberty in their private, consensual, sexual activity.80 While Lawrence is often lauded by those
who emphasize the egalitarian content of the right thereby conferred,81 Marc
Spindelman has examined the harm involved in entrenching and valorizing
those rights as a condition to their extension. As Spindelman details, the
normative power of the rights claim asserted by the Lawrence defendants
rests on “the presumptive goodness of heterosexuality, a sexual status that is
78. Pp. 49–50; see MacKinnon, supra note 34, at 20–22 (chronicling studies demonstrating how victims of domestic violence “are in no position to face men as equals in a legal
setting, even when formally on the same plane, represented by counsel”).
79. MacKinnon, supra note 34, at 9.
80. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
81. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1898 (2004) (“Lawrence, more than any other decision in the Supreme Court’s history, both presupposed and advanced an explicitly equalitybased and relationally situated theory of substantive liberty.”).
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socially sacrosanct and legally protected.”82 Consequently, the Lawrence decision “validates heterosexuality and trumpets its intimacies”83 as a necessary
precondition to idealizing sexual rights as something befitting dignity.
In the process of this validation, the Lawrence Court overwrote a lengthy
history of power inequality and sexual abuse within the institution of normative heterosexuality. It whitewashed a social reality of domination, currently lived by millions of women, with a new narrative—one of sexual
choice and enduring personal bonds.84 At times, Spindelman’s analysis of
Lawrence appears eerily like a dystopic reading of Waldron’s “expanding circle.” Waldron views the democratization of aristocracy optimistically:
Every man a duke, every woman a queen, everyone entitled to the sort of
deference and consideration, everyone’s person and body sacrosanct, in the
way that nobles were entitled to deference or in the way that an assault
upon the body or the person of a king was regarded as a sacrilege. (p. 34)

Spindelman offers an alternative interpretation:
Lesbians and gay men receive the sexual rights that heterosexuals do by
analogical extension. . . . Translated: the Court vindicates sexual liberty by
recognizing heterosexuals’ sexual rights and advances “equality of treatment” by extending that liberty to lesbians and gay men. Rights that are
made to the king’s measure are fit for a queen.85

Where Spindelman’s work addresses the effect of valorizing dignitarian
rights, Katherine Franke has recently explored the norming effect of dignity
discourse on the persons seeking those rights. In a response to another of
Waldron’s considerable works on dignity, Franke chronicles the social posturing required of gay men and lesbian women challenging the legality of
California’s Proposition 8, which, like DOMA, defined “marriage” exclusively as the union of an opposite-sex couple.86 She explains how, in order to
be recognized as dignified—and hence rights deserving—same-sex couples
find themselves forced to “mount ritualized, repeated performances of
responsibilized citizenship designed, over time, to convince a court, a legislature, the public, and to some degree themselves, that they have put their
errant ways behind them and/or that they have been horribly
misunderstood.”87
In Dignity, Rank, and Rights, Waldron embraces just such performances.
Cleverly dubbing them “moral orthopedics,” Waldron emphasizes that
dignified citizens should boast “a certain sort of presence; uprightness of
82. Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1615, 1619
(2004).
83. Id. at 1635.
84. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring.”).
85. Spindelman, supra note 82, at 1629–30 (footnote omitted).
86. Franke, supra note 8, at 1184, 1189.
87. Id. at 1183.
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bearing; self-possession and self-control; self-presentation as someone to be
reckoned with; not being abject, pitiable, distressed, or overly submissive in
circumstances of adversity.”88 As Franke rightly notes, in practice, demanding this sort of respectability pantomime as a prerequisite to fundamental
rights not only conforms those seeking recognition to heteronormative standards but also redoubles the vulnerability and indignity of those who do
not, or cannot, conform.89
Waldron’s historical account is thus troubling. Fortunately, there is
nothing in his account of dignity as a legal status that requires explaining our
current practices as the literal extension of aristocratic entitlements. Aristocratic status might serve as a handy analogue, illustrating the relationship
between social rank and legal rights. And surely the dignitas of aristocracy is
linguistically connected to the law’s contemporary dignity discourse, such
that understanding the senses of the former may help us to interpret the
character of the latter. But reducing contemporary legal dignity to the mere
replication of preexisting rights—rights frequently premised on the social
inequality of those to whom they are now being offered—threatens to undermine legal dignity’s very utility. Rather than affirming our shared humanity, Waldron’s narrative of extension practically exalts existing modes of
being and lends them normative force.
B. Dignity and Equality
Waldron’s failure to anticipate the concerns raised above may stem, in
part, from an underdeveloped perspective on the relationship between dignity and equality. Although Waldron acknowledges that equality and dignity
are interdependent (p. 55), Dignity, Rank, and Rights never clearly articulates
the egalitarian dimensions of dignity’s status. Take the following assertion,
which Waldron uses to summarize his “expanding circle” view of dignity as
extended aristocracy: “We have adopted the idea of a single-status system,
evolving a more or less universal status—a more or less universal legal dignity—that entitles everyone to something like the treatment before the law
that was previously confined to high-status individuals” (p. 57; footnote
omitted). In the span of a single sentence, Waldron hints at both a distributive principle (“universal status”) and a substantive guarantee (an entitlement to particular treatment), yet he equivocates on the necessity of either
(“more or less”).
On the one hand, it is possible that Waldron simply conceives of equality formally, achieved by the universal distribution of dignity’s constituent
rights. He has advanced a similar argument elsewhere in discussing human
rights, supporting the position that the phrase “human rights” implies a
formal distributive principle—“they are rights held by all humans in virtue
88. P. 22. As early as Cicero, the concept of dignity has been associated with humanity’s
unique posture; the upright gait serves as a metaphor of our distinctiveness. See Rosen, supra
note 3, at 159–60.
89. Franke, supra note 8, at 1197.
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of their humanity.”90 On the other hand, Waldron’s account of dignity-asrank appears to contemplate an actual performance—Waldron’s dignity inheres in “the active exercise of a legally defined status” rather than in the
mere possession of some package of rights (p. 29). And if this is correct, we
should expect dignity to entail some guarantee of substantive equality as a
predicate to exercising the rights conferred by the status; it is well understood that substantive inequalities genuinely impede the capacity to benefit
from legal rights.91 Waldron’s silence on this point suggests that, throughout
the book, he tacitly assumes that dignity’s bearers are social equals.
In this Section, I would like to explore the possibility that Waldron’s
theory might be enriched by embracing a commitment to substantive equality, one typically captured by those conceptions of dignity framed in terms
of human worth. Expressions of worth have long informed the legal and
philosophical discourse concerned with human dignity.92 In the Kantian
tradition, for example, dignity is often described as that which “is raised
above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent.”93 On the Catholic
front, dignity is often used to describe the sacred worth of human life and
our basic duty to respect and preserve it.94 Yet, rather early in Dignity, Rank,
and Rights, Waldron dispenses with conceptions of dignity that invoke
human worth, which he views as in competition with his status-based alternative. He argues that such conceptions inappropriately deploy the word
“dignity” to express “a type of value or a fact about value” when better
words are at our disposal (including, simply, “worth”).95 I revisit Waldron’s
rejection of worth here, not to critique that choice but in order to propose a
friendly amendment that incorporates notions of human worth into a coherent jurisprudence of human dignity premised on legal status.
Waldron’s primary evidence that notions of worth are not properly part
of a status-based theory of dignity turns on social responses. “The thing to
do with something of value,” Waldron says, “is promote it or protect it,
perhaps maximize things of that kind, at any rate to treasure it. The thing to
do with a ranking status is to respect and defer to the person who bears it”
(p. 24). Because Waldron views respect and deference as the core of legal
dignity, he sees worth as an incompatible alternative to status.
90. Jeremy Waldron, Human Rights: A Critique of the Raz/Rawls Approach 2, 21 (N.Y.
Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-32,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272745.
91. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273,
292–97 (1997).
92. McCrudden, supra note 2, at 7–8.
93. Kant, supra note 18, at 42.
94. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 3, at 96–100.
95. P. 24. I hope that I am not exposing my own cognitive limitations when I admit that
I find this tactic perplexing. Given Waldron’s efforts elsewhere in the book to admonish those
who make too much of small inconsistencies—“the indignant recording of such impressions is
what passes for philosophical analysis in some circles,” p. 16—it is disappointing to see him
elide any attempt to reconcile worth and status.
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Yet our laws do frequently promote or protect dignity just as if it were,
to borrow Waldron’s phrase, “something of value.” Perhaps unintentionally,
Waldron himself acknowledges this in a section titled, ironically enough,
“Protecting Status” (pp. 47–49). There, Waldron catalogues the myriad ways
in which modern law “commit[s] itself to protection and vindication of the
high rank or dignity of the ordinary person” (p. 48). Such protections include prohibitions on degrading treatment, hate speech, and invidious discrimination (pp. 48–49). If Waldron is correct that protections of this sort
are more properly a response to worth than to status, his theory of dignity
must either incorporate worth or else disavow such prohibitions as unbefitting dignity, properly understood.
The move, I think, is obvious. As Waldron’s own examples demonstrate,
law protects dignity, rather than defers to it, in response to practices of inequality—to degradation and discrimination. Judgments of worth are necessary antecedents to such practices. As Catharine MacKinnon explains, “The
essence of inequality is the misanthropic notion—misogynist in the case of
women—that some are intrinsically more worthy than others, hence justly
belong elevated over them . . . .”96 By prohibiting inequality, legal dignity
implicitly affirms the equal worth of those protected.97 Indeed, much of our
contemporary human-dignity jurisprudence grew out of the atrocities of the
Holocaust, atrocities premised on the dehumanization and objectification of
an entire people.98 Since then, dignity has been fundamental to the legalrecognition projects of many marginalized and objectified groups.99
That human dignity sometimes operates by affirming human worth
need not threaten Waldron’s status-based account.100 As discussed above,
Waldron’s ambivalence about the relationship between dignity and equality
suggests that his work begins from a tacit assumption of substantive social
equality. That assumption insulates his work from the value judgments—the
question of who is “worthy”—that precede the distribution of rights and
status. And, among social equals, the status-based dignity that Waldron articulates holds much promise. At times, however, it is necessary for law to
communicate to the world the worth of the dignified in order to protect
96. MacKinnon, supra note 34, at 12 (emphasis added).
97. For more on the expressive function of dignity-based laws, see generally Tarunabh
Khaitan, Dignity as an Expressive Norm: Neither Vacuous Nor a Panacea, 32 Oxford J. Legal
Stud. 1 (2012).
98. McCrudden, supra note 16, at 662–65.
99. Id. at 689–92.
100. Christopher McCrudden has taken this argument even further, suggesting that equal
status may simply be one instantiation of equal worth. See McCrudden, supra note 2, at 42–43.
Although I am inclined to agree, my argument here is narrower. Waldron claims that we
should reserve the word “dignity” to refer to status, even where status derives from worth. P.
24. The neat separation that Waldron proposes is infeasible because, as Waldron himself admits, statuses are expressive: they convey the reason for packaging certain rights and duties
together. P. 124. In operation, the legal status of dignity necessarily communicates something
about the worth of its bearer, and that expressive function has (and should have) legal force in
defending against practices of inequality.
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individual entitlements to dignity’s high status. Indeed, we may eventually
come to recognize the universality of contemporary dignity as the propagation of the worth associated with being a dignified status bearer—an attempt, as Waldron would say, to “maximize things of that kind” (p. 24).
Perhaps some notion of worth is precisely what ensures humanity’s leveling
up rather than its leveling down.
Humanity is a common venture. At times, the exercise of legal rights
might aid us in recognizing the commonality of that venture—as in Waldron’s example of the “momentous” right to vote (p. 36). The status of
dignity provides us those rights. At other times, however, it may be necessary to affirm our shared humanity first, as a predicate to using rights. Because the status of dignity communicates the fundamental worth of each of
us, it can do that, too. It narrows the distance between individuals and
pushes back against the worst instincts of humankind. Dignity is a rich and
multifaceted concept, capable of such duality.101
Conclusion
Dignity, Rank, and Rights is an unusual, and unusually refreshing, exercise in legal philosophy. Although Waldron modestly casts his contribution
as simply a “thought experiment” (p. 144), his account of dignity as a legal
status is meticulously researched, engages with a broad collection of thinkers
and theories, and offers real insights into dignity’s legal dimensions. It is all
the better for the outstanding contributions of the book’s commentators,
who provide incisive challenges to Waldron’s occasionally tendentious
claims (and whose work I have regrettably given short shrift in these few
pages).
The book’s rare shortcomings are largely attributable to the risks associated with working at the level of theory. The concepts we explore purport to
capture the lived experiences of real people, and we must therefore be particularly sensitive to those areas where our normative ideals fail to govern our
social practices. In the case of dignity, it is important that the way we portray the concept maintains its utility as a tool for remedying injustice and
inequality. I am concerned that Waldron’s portrait of dignity as rank democratized would foreclose that kind of social change, entrenching legalrights traditions established from underinclusive viewpoints. I urge Waldron
to revisit the idea of human worth as a bridge between dignity as a ranking
status and the substantive equalities that are a precondition to its exercise.

101. Many common accounts of dignity similarly recognize multiple dimensions to the
concept. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs 13–14, 191–218 (2011) (arguing that human dignity comprises both (1) valuing human life and (2) exercising moral decisionmaking); Martha C. Nussbaum, Sex & Social Justice 57 (1999) (describing the liberal
view of dignity as a “twofold intuition about human beings: namely, that all, just by being
human, are of equal dignity and worth, no matter where they are situated in society, and that
the primary source of this worth is a power of moral choice within them, a power that consists
in the ability to plan a life in accordance with one’s own evaluations of ends”).

